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Abstract
Given the rich literature regarding lifetime employment, the purpose of this Comment is to
provide an overview of the evolution of this system as well as hlight broader policy implications
for the Japanese economy and society. Part I will provide background information on lifetime
employment including an overview of the main theories that explain the origins of lifetime em-
ployment, its relationship to labor laws in Japan, and provide a comparison between employment
systems in the United States and Japan. Part II attempts to answer the frequently asked question,
“is lifetime employment disappearing?” by considering existing quantitative studies as well as
analyzing the possible reasons that aim to explain why the system has or has not changed. Finally,
Part III will provide general comments and broader policy implications.
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INTRODUCTION 
In Japan, lifetime employment is a popular topic among 
scholars; in fact, “[s]ome researchers regard these employment 
practices as one of the most important characteristics of the Japanese 
economic system.” 1  Lifetime employment refers to the system in 
Japan where both the employer and employee expect that the 
employee will work for the employer until retirement age.2 
The viability of lifetime employment is particularly relevant 
today given the widespread changes in Japan.3 Specifically, Japan is 
facing a population crisis and has been experiencing a recession for 
years. 4  Additionally, significant changes in Japan’s corporate 
governance are likely to impact lifetime employment. 5  As such, 
topical questions to consider are whether lifetime employment is 
                                                                                                             
1. Naohito Abe & Satoshi Shimizutani, Employment Policy and Corporate Governance: 
An Empirical Comparison of the Stakeholder Versus the Profit-Maximization Model, HI-STAT 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, no. 92, 1-2 (June 2005); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, 
Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 508, 509 (1999) (“[L]ifetime employment for core workers is said to be at the 
center of Japanese corporate governance and labor relations . . . and is said to be central 
enough to be supported by other Japanese governance institutions, such as cross-
shareholdings, inside boards of directors and the main bank system.”). 
2.  See infra Part I.A. 
3.  See infra Part II.B. 
4.  See Stephen Mulrenan, Population Crisis: Can Japan Lead the Way in Finding a 
Solution?, 68 NO. 1 IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT 33, 33 (2014) (explaining that Japan will have a 
“top-heavy population and a diminished workforce, which is unable to support its elderly 
citizens”); see also Michael A. Witt, Japan: Coordinated Capitalism Between Institutional 
Change and Structural Inertia in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
100-22 (Michael A. Witt and Gordon Redding, eds., 2014) (noting the “shrinking and rapidly 
ageing population”). 
5.  See infra Part II.B. Generally, corporate governance refers to the “system by which 
companies are directed and controlled.” See Klaus J. Hopt, Introduction and Questionnaire for 
the Country Reports, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FUNCTIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 1095, 1096 (Andreas M. Fleckner & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 2013). 
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changing, and, perhaps more importantly, whether lifetime 
employment is still a useful and efficient system in Japan.6 
Given the rich literature regarding lifetime employment, the 
purpose of this Comment is to provide an overview of the evolution 
of this system as well as highlight broader policy implications for the 
Japanese economy and society. Part I will provide background 
information on lifetime employment including an overview of the 
main theories that explain the origins of lifetime employment, its 
relationship to labor laws in Japan, and provide a comparison between 
employment systems in the United States and Japan. Part II attempts 
to answer the frequently asked question, “is lifetime employment 
disappearing?” by considering existing quantitative studies as well as 
analyzing the possible reasons that aim to explain why the system has 
or has not changed. Finally, Part III will provide  general comments 
and broader policy implications. 
I. LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN 
Part I will provide a broad  overview of the lifetime employment 
system in Japan. First, Part I.A. will highlight the main mechanisms 
of lifetime employment. Second, Part I.B. will explore the origins of 
lifetime employment. Third, Part I.C. will provide an overview of 
Japanese labor law and how it relates to lifetime employment. Lastly, 
Part I.D. compares employment practices in the United States and 
Japan. 
A. A Brief Overview of the Lifetime Employment System 
“Lifetime employment” refers to the system that emerged in 
Japan after World War II where, the “mutual expectation of employer 
and employee is that the employee will enjoy continuous employment 
until mandatory retirement age.” 7  While long-term employment is 
                                                                                                             
6.  See Ryo Kambayashi & Takao Kato, The Japanese Employment System After the 
Bubble Burst: New Evidence 3 (COLUMBIA U. CTR. ON JAPANESE ECON. & BUS., Working 
Paper No. 268, 2009) (“There are currently lively debates among scholars and policy makers 
surrounding the viability of the practice of ‘lifetime employment.’”); see also Hiroshi Ono, 
Lifetime Employment in Japan: Concepts and Measurements, 24 J. JAPANESE & INT’L 
ECONOMIES 1, 3 (2010) (“Most recently, the debate focuses on the ‘Lost Decade’ of the 1990s 
and its impact on the lifetime employment system.”). 
7.  Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in 
Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2092 (2001); see also Witt, supra 
note 4 (explaining that the retirement age has been increased from fifty-five to sixty). 
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found in other developed countries such as Germany, France, and the 
United States, it is more common in Japan, and “on average, Japanese 
workers stay in the same firm for longer periods than American 
workers, and . . . the turnover rate of the former [has been] lower.”8 
The expectation of lifetime employment is typically not memorialized 
in a contract. 9  While there is a general consensus that lifetime 
employment applies most commonly to employees at large 
companies, there is some disagreement over whether smaller and 
medium-sized companies also use lifetime employment policies. 10 
Furthermore, lifetime employment generally applies to white-collar 
workers and only sometimes to blue-collar workers.11 
Additionally, lifetime employment is reinforced by Japan's 
salary structure, which focuses more on seniority than performance.12 
Specifically, “semi-annual bonuses, an integral part of the salary 
structure, are loosely tied to firm performance and pensions are 
generally not portable.”13 In addition, scholars almost unanimously 
agree that “non-standard” workers are excluded from the lifetime 
employment system. 14  For instance, part-time employees are 
considered non-standard employees and therefore do not enjoy the 
                                                                                                             
8.  Atsushi Tsuneki & Manabu Matsunaka, Labor Relations and Labor Law in Japan, 
20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 529, 532 (2011); see also infra Part I.D (comparing the 
employment practices in Japan and the United States). 
9.  See Witt, supra note 4; see also Ono, supra note 6, at 2 (“Lifetime employment is not 
a contractual state. . . . The employment contract includes no explicit clause mentioning this 
policy, and employers are under no obligation to guarantee employment.”). 
10.  See Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2087 (explaining that lifetime employment covers 
employees at large firms); see also Witt, supra note 4 (“[M]ost small and medium-sized 
enterprises tended to follow the same basic norm of long-term employment.”). 
11.  See Milhaupt, supra note 7 (explaining that lifetime employment covers white-
collar firms and most blue-collar workers); see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 
532 (“[W]hite-collar, and at least some blue-collar workers are embraced within the same 
system of long-term employment.”). 
12 .  See Witt, supra note 4 (explaining that the seniority system has not changed 
significantly). 
13.  Milhaupt, supra note 7; see also Andrew Pollack, Japanese Starting to Link Pay to 
Performance, Not Tenure, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/02/
world/japanese-starting-to-link-pay-to-performance-not-tenure.html (“Salary depends much 
more on how long one has worked for the company than on how much one contributes to it.”). 
14.  The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 8 (“[T]he 
literature almost unanimously considers non-standard employment workers outside of the 
‘lifetime employment’ system.”); see Witt, supra note 4 (noting that there has been a rise in 
non-regular workers who do not have guarantees of lifetime employment); see also Tsuneki & 
Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 534 (“[T]here are many non-regular workers (atypical workers) 
such as part-time workers and dispatched workers that are differentiated from regular workers 
in promotion, payment, and employment guarantee.”). 
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benefits of lifetime employment.15 Lastly, women historically have 
been excluded from the lifetime employment system.16 
B. The Origins of Lifetime Employment 
There are three main theories that have developed to explain 
why lifetime employment emerged in Japan:(1) economics; (2) 
politics; and (3) culture and social norms. This Section explores each 
theory in turn. While scholars focus on different factors to explain the 
emergence of lifetime employment, they tend to agree that the law is 
not the sole reason for its emergence.17 
1. Economic Theory 
Some scholars contend that lifetime employment arose as a 
business strategy to incentivize workers to stay at one company.18 
Specifically, lifetime employment “give[s] workers the proper 
incentive to invest in human capital” and “encourage[s] skill 
acquisition on the part of workers and to maintain a high level of 
effort.”19 Generally, both employers and employees are motivated to 
invest in training because lifetime employment “gives both sides 
reasonable assurance that their investments will pay off.” 20  For 
                                                                                                             
15.  For a discussion on the distinction between standard and nonstandard work, see The 
Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 8. 
16.  Akira Kawaguchi & Kimitaka Nishitani, Corporate Governance and the Role of 
Women, 39 JAPANESE ECON. 49, 50 (2012) (explaining how women “have been excluded from 
the core of the Japanese-style employment system” because they are responsible for most 
housework and cannot meet typical work demands); see also Ono, supra note 6, at 6 (stating 
how women were historically “systematically excluded from lifetime employment””). 
17.  See Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2093; see also infra Part I.C (explaining that lifetime 
employment is not legally mandated). 
18.  Caslav Pejovic, Japanese Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 483, 494 (2011) (“Long-term employment in its present form developed as a 
result of economic benefits.”). See generally Gilson & Roe, supra note 1 (explaining possible 
economic arguments). 
19.  Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 509-10; see The Japanese Employment System After 
the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 2 (““[L]ocal knowledge accumulated through collaboration 
of workers is often firm-specific in nature, and its value will be considerably lower outside of 
the firm. As such, in the absence of the practice of ‘lifetime employment,’ workers will have 
less incentive to accumulate such firm-specific human capital.”). 
20.  Witt, supra note 4, at 11; see also Tomohiko Noda, Determinants of the Timing of 
Downsizing among Large Japanese Firms: Long-term Employment Practices and Corporate 
Governance, 64 JAPANESE ECON. REV. 363, 368 (2013) (“Unless some degree of job security 
is credibly assured, workers will have less incentive to accumulate such firm-specific skills; 
thus firms, invest in their reputation of not reneging on implicit contracts by issuing arbitrary 
dismissals.”). 
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instance, 70.5 percent of employers will provide regular workers with 
on-the-job training.21 Similarly,, 57.8 percent of firms implemented 
“deliberately-planned” on-the-job training for regular employees but 
only 27.7 percent of firms have similar training for non-regular 
employees. “” 22  Furthermore, “67.1 percent of firms reported 
implementing [off-the-job training] for regular employees” but only 
31.4 percent of firms provide the same training for non-regular 
employees. 23  Moreover, “the quality and intensity of [on-the-job 
training] offered to regular employees is higher than that of [training] 
for non-regular employees.”24 Additionally, “employees are willing to 
train their own successors if they benefit from lifetime employment 
because there is no risk that he will be replaced.”25 In other words, 
employees may not share valuable knowledge about the company 
without lifetime employment “” because they may fear that their own 
job could be eliminated.26 
Classical human capital theory highlights the importance of 
lifetime employment for ensuring that an “efficient level of 
investment in firm-specific human capital.” 27  For a labor market 
without lifetime employment, firms will not have the proper 
incentives to invest in their employees if they are free to change jobs 
after being trained.”28 Consequently, employees are not incentivized 
to invest in the company since their employers are also not 
incentivized to compensate their employees for their investment 
                                                                                                             
21.  Witt, supra note 4. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id.; see also Randall S. Jones, Income Inequality, Poverty and Social Spending in 
Japan 10 (OECD Econ. Dep’t Working Papers, Working Paper No. 556, 2007) (“[N]on-
regular workers receive less on-the-job training.”). 
25.  See Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 513; see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 
8, at 536 (“Such a system succeeds only when workers are offered incentives for making 
efforts to accumulate strictly firm-specific intellectual skills including the willingness to rotate 
among various types of jobs depending on the economic environment or the process of OJT, 
and the willingness of senior workers to accept and train young workers on the job.”). 
26.  The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 2. See 
generally Gilson & Roe, supra note 1 (explaining firm-specific human capital). 
27.  Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 536. See generally GARY S. BECKER, 
HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
EDUCATION (3d ed. 1994). 
28.  See Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 511; see Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 
536 (“[A] competitive labor market does not ensure an efficient level of investment in firm-
specific human capital.”). 
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effort.29 Although, in a fluid external labor market, “employees could 
pay for their general skills themselves . . . either directly, by paying 
the tuition for training programs and education, or indirectly, by 
accepting a lower wage while they are being trained,” they generally 
are ill informed of what skills are required for the future.30 Contracts 
also cannot solve this human capital investment problem because 
“courts cannot observe the level of human capital investment” and an 
employee therefore will not invest in training if he is paid 
beforehand.31 The worker also “will be less motivated to invest as he 
cannot rely on a firm’s promise to pay later for the same reason of 
verifiability.” 32  As such, without lifetime employment, both 
employers and employees will underinvest in human capital.33 
Some scholars conclude that the efficient level of investment in 
human capital due to lifetime employment has enhanced productivity 
and helped the Japanese economy grow. 34  Specifically, scholars 
contend that this labor system “can be naturally understood as a 
superior economic system in adjusting to an uncertain and changing 
economic environment.” 35  Furthermore, “game-theoretic 
contributions argue that labor relations in both the United States and 
Japan can be characterized as two possibly efficient equilibria of the 
                                                                                                             
29. See Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 536; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 
1, at 512 (explaining that neither side will invest in human capital because the “employer fears 
losing its investment if the external labor market is fluid; the employee fears losing his or her 
investment if the employer reneges on the promised return”). 
30. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 511. See generally Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra   
note 8. 
31. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 536. See generally Gilson & Roe, supra   
note 1. 
32. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 536. See generally Gilson & Roe, supra   
note 1. 
33. Interestingly, Gilson and Roe argue that employers “invest in their employees’ skills 
not because of the friendly Japanese institution of firms promising their employees lifetime 
employment – an institution often viewed admiringly in the American literature. Rather, a dark 
and gloomy closing of the external labor market played a key role: Employees cannot change 
jobs, because the Japanese external labor market is weak, and deliberately weak.” Gilson & 
Roe, supra note 1, at 513. 
34 . The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 1 
(explaining that there is “some evidence that the aforementioned Japanese employment system 
indeed helped Japanese firms enhance their productivity”); see also Pejovic, supra note 18, at 
494 (stating that “[i]t contributed to a greater productivity that benefited both the shareholders 
and management through higher profits, as well as labor through greater employment 
security”). 
35. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 531; see also Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 
1, at 2 (arguing that Japan’s employment practices “achieve[] an efficient allocation of 
resources”). 
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same game played by similarly rational players facing different 
institutional environments.”36 
This Section explored the economic explanation for the 
emergence of lifetime employment. It discussed how some scholars 
suggest that lifetime employment arose to incentivize workers to stay 
at one company and to ensure an efficient level of human capital 
investment. In addition, this Section highlighted how some scholars 
argue that lifetime employment results in greater productivity and has 
helped the Japanese economy. 
2. Political Theory 
Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe, professors at Stanford Law School 
and Harvard Law School, respectively, contend that “lifetime 
employment resulted more from political than from human-capital 
based economic forces.”37 They rule out a purely economic rationale 
because lifetime employment started at a time when there was a labor 
surplus, which is counterintuitive since employers could hire 
employees for lower wages and did not have an incentive to make 
commitments to keep workers for a long time. 38  Gilson and Roe 
conclude that politics can explain this contradiction.39 During World 
War II, the Japanese government tried to reduce the high turnover rate 
by strictly regulating “hiring, firing and voluntary termination.” 40 
However, despite government intervention, “skilled workers . . . 
remained ready to shift jobs, even illegally, throughout World War 
II.” 41  After World War II, organized labor became prevalent, 
primarily because the United States occupation authorities 
encouraged it.42 For instance, the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers implemented the Trade Union Law of 1945 “to guarantee[] 
                                                                                                             
36. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 531. 
37 . Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 516; see also Pejovic, supra note 18, at 494 
(explaining that “[t]he government supported lifetime employment because it contributed to 
reducing the tensions between employers and employees”). 
38. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 520-21 (explaining that “labor was abundant, people 
without jobs starved, and firms could hire at low wages and fire at will”). 
39. Id.; see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 534 (explaining that before 
World War Two, the Japanese economy had a classical market system with a competitive 
labor market . . . ”). 
40. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 520. 
41 . Andrew Gordon, THE EVOLUTION OF LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN: HEAVY 
INDUSTRY, 1853-1955 274 (1985). 
42. Id.; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 521. 
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workers the right to form unions and to strike.”43 This law proved to 
be overwhelmingly successful, as union membership increased 
thirteen-fold by the end of 1946.44 
Given this background, Gilson and Roe hypothesize that lifetime 
employment emerged through a “‘deal’ that allowed restructuring 
while at the same time bringing social peace, suppressing radical 
labor and reducing the chance of a socialist electoral victory by 
privileging one sector of labor.”45 Furthermore, on a more local level, 
“[w]hen managers sought to rationalize production in a restructured 
firm, they might have privileged the surviving employees with 
lifetime employment, to reduce post-restructuring labor unrest.”46 In 
other words, companies used lifetime employment as a mechanism to 
downsize without exacerbating the threat of organized labor, which 
had already become a concern.47 Gilson and Roe also acknowledge 
that the emergence of lifetime employment could be interpreted in a 
more positive manner; managers finally gave in to “some workers’ 
demands for security . . . that [made] the favored workers more 
willing to cede control to management.” 48  They conclude their 
argument by explaining that lifetime employment later attracted its 
complements, such as seniority wages, main bank monitoring, and 
mandatory retirement.49 
Curtis Milhaupt, a professor specializing in Japanese law at 
Columbia Law School, supports this hypothesis but frames it as a 
social norm rather than focusing solely on political motivations.50 He 
explains that, although Gilson and Roe characterized the emergence 
of lifetime employment as “‘political’ to emphasize the noneconomic 
rationale,” lifetime employment should be understood as part of a 
                                                                                                             
43. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 521; see also Gordon, supra note 41. 
44. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 521; see also Gordon, supra note 41. 
45. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 522. 
46 . Id.; see also Nobuhiro Hiwatari, The Origins of Lifetime Employment, in 
EMPLOYEES’ ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) 
(stating that “[m]anagement then carried out massive layoffs and a purge of radical union 
leaders . . . Then to reunite the [remaining] employees, management and new unions 
emphasized employment security. . . .”). 
47 . Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 522; see also Pejovic, supra note 18, at 494 
(explaining that lifetime employment “was allegedly designed as a result of a compromise 
entered in to between management and unions aimed at overcoming existing labor problems”). 
48. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 523. 
49. Id. at 531; see also supra Part I.A. 
50. See Milhaupt, supra note 7. 
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“larger social pact to bring stability to postwar Japan.”51 He concludes 
that new corporate governance norms, such as lifetime employment, 
“emerged as both low-cost substitutes for legal rules in the 
institutional turmoil of the immediate postwar period and as a fount of 
private benefits for the few organized groups left intact after the war 
and Allied occupation.”52 Regardless of what label scholars attach to 
the theory, this “political” explanation focuses more generally on 
Japanese society at the time lifetime employment emerged rather than 
on economic factors. 
3. Cultural and Social Norms Theory 
Some scholars argue that lifetime employment is rooted in 
Japanese history and culture. 53  According to this theory, lifetime 
employment originates from the Tokugawa period, where “business 
entities functioned like family businesses.”54 Companies, or kaisha, 
“symbolize[] the organization where people are not united by 
contractual relationships, but it includes an element of association 
resembling that of a family.”55 Consequently, by operating businesses 
like a kaisha, the employer can “achieve[] a greater level of loyalty 
between management and employees.”56 
Caslav Pejovic, a professor at Kyushuu University in Japan, 
slightly alters this argument by focusing on how Japanese culture and 
social norms helped make the implementation of corporate 
governance practices successful. 57  He argues that lifetime 
employment is “perfectly congruent with Japanese social values,” and 
therefore was implemented more smoothly because it was “familiar to 
employees based on their experiences and education outside the 
company.” 58  In other words, while Pejovic does not attribute the 
emergence of lifetime employment solely to Japanese culture, he 
                                                                                                             
51. Id. at 2093-94. 
52. Id. at 2087. 
53. See Pejovic, supra note 18 (explaining that Japanese culture and social norms have 
helped with the implementation of lifetime employment); see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, 
supra note 8, at 534 (referring to the cultural theories to explain the origin of lifetime 
employment). 
54. Pejovic, supra note 18, at 496. See generally Yasuzo Horie, The Role of IE in the 
Economic Modernization of Japan, 36 KYOTO UNIV. ECON. REV. 1 (1966). 
55. Pejovic, supra note 18, at 497. See generally Horie, supra note 54. 
56. Pejovic, supra note 18, at 497. See generally Horie, supra note 54. 
57. Pejovic, supra note 18, at 502. 
58. Id. 
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maintains that it was critical in lifetime employment’s “successful 
implementation and functioning in practice.”59 
However, many scholars have discredited the cultural argument 
because historically, workers have not continuously enjoyed stable, 
long-term employment in Japan.60 In fact, workers often changed jobs 
after World War I: “Yearly turnover rates of around seventy-five 
percent were the norm in most industries during World War I.”61 
Moreover, Tsuneki and Matsunaka point out that “these culture-based 
explanations . . . are inconclusive because . . . lifetime 
employment exist[s] in all developed capitalist countries.”62 
This Section provided an overview of the three main arguments 
that scholars have put forth to explain the emergence of lifetime 
employment. First, scholars have provided an economics explanation 
that focuses on how lifetime employment resulted in an efficient level 
of human capital investment. Second, scholars have suggested that 
lifetime employment emerged as part of an effort to stabilize postwar 
Japan. Lastly, while some scholars contend that lifetime employment 
is rooted in Japanese culture and history, other scholars have 
discredited this theory because lifetime employment exists in other 
developed countries and was not always prominent in Japan. 
C. Labor Law in Japan 
Milhaupt explains that Japanese labor law did not necessitate 
lifetime employment, but rather that a legal framework emerged to 
reinforce the system later on.63 Specifically, “it is unlikely that the 
threat of legal sanction was the primary motivation [for lifetime 
employment because] [w]hile some cases of abusive dismissal predate 
the emergence of lifetime employment practices, the Supreme Court 
did not affirm the standards developed in the lower courts until 
                                                                                                             
59. Id. 
60. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 517 (stating that “the conventional claim that 
lifetime employment is rooted in Japanese culture (and needs no more explanation) is not 
enough.”); see also Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2087 (discrediting the cultural argument as 
misstating Japanese history); Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 534-35 (explaining that 
“[t]he cultural theories are also questionable from a historical point of view. The customs 
discussed did not exist from the beginning of the Japanese economy.”). 
61. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 518; see also Gordon, supra note 41. 
62. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 534. 
63. See Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2094 (stating that “lifetime employment is a social 
norm that has been sanctioned and diffused by the state”). 
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1975.”64 In fact, prior to the doctrine of abusive dismissal, the Civil 
Code provided little employee protection and specified that 
“employment was terminable at will.”65 However, the labor laws in 
Japan have changed since this time to help reinforce lifetime 
employment. This Section will provide an overview of labor law in 
Japan and how it relates to the lifetime employment system. 
Courts generally determine that a dismissal is illegal if it is “not 
based on reasonable cause or [is] viewed as improper from the 
general viewpoint of society.” 66  Courts will typically find that a 
dismissal is abusive unless one of the following situations apply:  
(1) a worker [was] incapable of providing service, (2) a worker 
[was] incompetent or lack[ed] ability to work, (3) a worker 
violate[d] his or her job duties or [was] engaged in misconduct, 
(4) there [was] a compelling business necessity such as financial 
difficulties, or (5) a union shop agreement compel[ed] the 
employer to discharge a worker who [left] or [was] dispelled 
from the union.67 
Additionally, courts have developed four requirements to 
determine whether “there was a compelling business necessity” for a 
dismissal.68 The four requirements are: 
(1) a reduction of the workforce was necessary; (2) the employer 
made a good-faith effort to avoid dismissals, such as using 
transfers, temporary closings, and soliciting voluntary early 
retirements; (3) the employer established and followed a 
reasonable standard for choosing which workers would be 
dismissed; and (4) the employer made attempts to explain to the 
employees or union the reasons for the dismissals and how they 
                                                                                                             
64. Id. at 2093; see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 545 (explaining that “the 
Supreme Court finally endorsed the doctrine” in the late 1970s). 
65. Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: 
Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 421 (2014); see also Tsuneki & 
Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 543 (explaining that “[u]nder the Civil Code, both employers and 
employees can terminate this type of labor contract at will with two weeks’ notice.”). 
66. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 421; see also Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2093 
(explaining that “judicial precedent places substantial constraints on an employer’s ability to 
dismiss workers even where layoffs are motivated by economic necessity”); Tsuneki & 
Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 543 (stating that “[u]nder the doctrine, employers can dismiss 
workers only when there are reasonable and objective grounds to do so.”). 
67. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 421. 
68. Id.; see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 544 (explaining that the Doctrine 
of Abusive Dismissal requires four conditions to be met in the case of adjustment dismissal). 
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would be carried out.69 The doctrine of abusive dismissal has 
since been codified in the Labor Standards Act and Labor 
Contract Act, which apply to all private-sector employees.70 
In addition to the doctrine of abusive dismissal, other Japanese 
labor laws provide protection to employees. Specifically, labor laws 
“emphasize the protection of employment as its basic objective . . . 
[and] explicitly states the need for active intervention by the 
government in the labor market.”71 For instance, there are stringent 
regulations of private employment agencies. 72  The Public 
Employment Security Office, a government agency, has 
“monopolized placement and vocational guidance activities.” 73 
Additionally, if requested by the employee, the employer is required 
to provide a written explanation for why the employee was dismissed 
under the Labor Standards Act. “”74 Companies that have more than 
ten employees must inform the employees of all rules, including 
dismissal rules.75 Furthermore, “[b]efore implementing a collective 
dismissal, an employer must notify a government agency and consult 
with a relevant union or employee representative over the reasons for 
the layoffs, their timing, the identity of affected employees, and the 
nature of any re-employment assistance.” 76  The government also 
provides subsidies to certain companies facing financial problems.77 
                                                                                                             
69. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 422; see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra 
note 8, at 544 (listing the four requirements). 
70. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 422 (explaining that “Japan codified part of 
this unjust dismissal regime under the Labor Standards Act of 1947”); see also Tsuneki & 
Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 543 (explaining that the doctrine of abusive dismissal has been 
codified). 
71. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 552; see also Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 
65, at 421 (stating that “[o]ver the past half-century, Japan’s employment law has changed 
gradually to provide more protection to employees.”). 
72. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 552 (explaining that “private employment 
agencies had been strictly regulated”); see also Rodo Kijunho [Labor Standards Law], Law 
No. 49 of 1947, art. 6 (Japan). 
73. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 552; see also Rodo Kijunho [Labor Standards 
Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 6 (Japan). 
74. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 423; see also Rodo Kijunho [Labor Standards 
Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 22 (Japan). 
75. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 423; see also Rodo Kijunho [Labor Standards 
Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 89 (Japan). 
76. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 425; see also Koyo Taisaku [Employment 
Measures Act], Law No. 132 of 1966, art. 24 (Japan). 
77 . Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 424-25 (noting the requirements of the 
Employment Adjustment Subsidy Program); see also Chad Steinberg & Masato Nakane, To 
766 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:753 
For instance, “[t]he Employment Adjustment Subsidy Program 
requires that the firms spend this assistance on wage subsidies to 
workers on temporary leave, to workers temporarily transferred to a 
different company, or to educate and train dismissed workers.”78 
Consequently, labor laws and government intervention have 
helped to reinforce lifetime employment. Lifetime employment has 
also been generally accepted by society because there is a “general 
sense among many Japanese employers that, irrespective of the 
formal legal regime, dismissals without cause are something to be 
avoided, if possible.”79  As such, employers typically do not view 
dismissals as the first option during recessions and financial 
difficulties.80 Rather, “dismissals [are] avoided by restricting overtime 
work, suspending mid-career hiring, transferring and farming out 
workers to related companies, terminating the employment of non-
regular workers, and soliciting voluntary retirements by old 
workers.”81 
D. Comparing Japanese and United States Employment Practices 
Many scholars are interested in comparing employment in Japan 
and the United States because the two countries “represent[] two 
contrasting employment systems.” 82  Notably, many employers in 
Japan guarantee lifetime employment whereas “in the United States, 
employment is typically at will, although actual tenure is often long-
lasting.”83 In addition, employees in the United States “have neither 
                                                                                                             
Fire or to Hoard? Explaining Japan’s Labor Market Response in the Great Recession 12 (IMF 
Working Paper 2011) (discussing the subsidy program that developed in 1975 in Japan). 
78. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 424; see also Steinberg & Nakane, supra note 
77, at 12. 
79. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 424; see also Kazuo Sugeno, The Birth of the 
Labor Tribunal System in Japan: A Synthesis of Labor Law Reform and Judicial Reform 25 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 519, 523 (2004) (stating that “[f]irms still maintained the policy of 
not dismissing core workers as a commitment to the long term employment system.”). 
80. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 544 (explaining that “[d]ismissing typical 
workers was not regarded as the first option employers should take in recessions.”); see also 
infra Part II.A.1. 
81. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 544; see also infra Part II.A.1. 
82. Ryo Kambayashi & Takao Kato, Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security 
in Japan and the United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years 1 (Columbia U. Center on 
Japanese Econ. & Bus. Working Paper No. 302, 2012); see also Ono, supra note 6, at 23 
(explaining that “[c]omparisons of job mobility between these two countries should thus be 
understood as a comparison of two extremes.”). 
83. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 509; see also Henry Farber, Labor Market Adjustment 
to Globalization: Long-Term Employment in the United States and Japan 3 (Princeton U. 
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explicit nor implicit guarantees of permanent employment and the 
corporate governance system rarely involves labor.”84 Henry Farber, a 
professor at Princeton University, notes that “[t]he role of ‘life-time 
jobs’ has been highlighted as an important institutional, economic, 
and even cultural difference between the two countries and it is 
worthwhile to understand the degree to which this difference is real 
and the extent to which these relationships are changing.”85 Lastly, 
scholars are interested in determining whether there is a convergence 
of the United States and Japanese employment systems. 86  This 
Section will provide qualitative observations as well as an overview 
of quantitative studies comparing long-term employment in Japan and 
the United States.87 
Scholars generally agree that “job mobility is much higher in the 
[United States] than in Japan.” 88  Since the 1960s, long-term 
employment has been more common in Japan than in the United 
States. “”89 Specifically, “in the early 1980s, 74% kept the same job 
15 years later in Japan whereas only 48% did so in the United 
States.”90 Interestingly, Ryo Kambayashi and Takao Kato find that 
“the job stability gap for core employees between the two nations 
                                                                                                             
Working Paper 519, 2007) (explaining that “most workers find a job . . . that lasts for a long 
period of time. . . . ”). 
84. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 509; see also Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 
347 (stating that “[i]n the United States – absent a constitutional, statutory, or public-policy 
provision or ruling restricting the grounds for termination – nothing prevents the employer or 
employee from terminating the employment relationship without cause or notice”). There is 
some disagreement over whether the United States should “reconsider a rule – the at-will 
default – that differs so substantially from the approach taken by most other countries.” 
Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 348. However, “[t]he counterargument suggests that the 
at-will rule permits greater labor-market flexibility and hence a more efficient productive 
economy.” Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 348-49. 
85. Farber, supra note 83, at 2. 
86. See Kambayahi & Kato, supra note 82. See generally Farber, supra note 83. 
87. It is important to keep in mind that similar to the quantitative studies about lifetime 
employment in Japan, studies about employment in the United States are mixed. See Matissa 
Hollister, Employment Stability in the U.S. Labor Market Rhetoric versus Reality, 37 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 305, 306 (2011) (explaining that “views on the question of job stability are split”). 
88. Ono, supra note 6, at 23; see also Farber, supra note 83, at 2 (stating that “[t]here has 
historically been more long-term employment in Japan than in the U.S.”). 
89. Takao Kato, The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?: Evidence from National 
Surveys and Field Research, 15 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 489, 498 (2000); see also Farber, 
supra note 83, at 2 (explaining “[o]ver the last twenty-five years, job tenure has declined in the 
United States while remaining stable or even increasing somewhat in Japan, increasing the 
‘tenure gap’ between the two countries.”). 
90. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 498. 
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remains considerable” at over twenty percentage points. 91 
Specifically, the ten-year job retention rates remained at 
approximately “70% in Japan whereas “the rates dropped from “over 
50% in the 1980s to below 40% [in the late] 1990s” in the U.S.”92 
This is particularly interesting because, as Kambayashi and Kato 
note, it was the “U.S. with the longest economic expansion [and] not 
Japan with [the] “‘Lost Decade”‘ that showed more pronounced 
weakening of job stability. . . . ” 93  Similarly, Farber finds that 
“[o]ver the last twenty-five years, job tenure has declined in the 
United States while remaining stable or even increasing somewhat in 
Japan.” 94  Both scholars ultimately conclude that the employment 
systems in the United States and Japan are not converging.95 
There are some interesting differences when comparing certain 
categories of workers in the United States and Japan. First, there has 
been relatively little change in the tenure rates for women in the 
United States, but this is not so in Japan.96 Farber explains that there 
has “been very little movement over time” for females in the United 
States, while “[t]here has been a relatively small increase over time 
for Japanese females.” 97  In Japan, the fraction of female workers 
between thirty-five and sixty-four years old with at least ten-year 
tenure increased from 38.4% in 1979 to 44.5% in 2002.98 In addition, 
in Japan, “[f]orty percent were female in 1982 and by 2007, female 
employees constituted 47 percent of all employees age 18-54.”99 
Farber also found that there has been a noticeable increase in 
female workers in Japan as part-time workers.100 For instance, “19.3 
percent of employed women in Japan worked part-time in 1980 while 
                                                                                                             
91.  Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United States: 
the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 8. Ryo Kambayashi is the W.S. Schupf Professor 
of Economics and Far Eastern Studies at Colgate University. Takao Kato is an Associate 
Professor for the Institution of Economic Research at Hitotsubashi University. 
92. See id. 
93. Id. 
94. Farber, supra note 83, at 2. 
95. See id.; Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United 
States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82.  
96. See Farber, supra note 83, at 21; Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security 
in Japan and the United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 18 (explaining 
that “female employees face higher job loss probability” in both countries). 
97. Farber, supra note 83, at 21. 
98. Id. 
99. See Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United 
States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 12. 
100. Farber, supra note 83, at 21.  
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fully 39.7 percent worked part-time in 2002.”101 On the other hand, in 
the United States, “22.6 percent of employed women worked part-
time in 1981 while 20.9 percent worked part-time in 2002.” 102 
Second, Kambayashi and Kato conclude that while “job stability for 
mid-career hires and youth employees did deteriorate in Japan over 
the last twenty-five years,” a similar decline was not observed in the 
United States.103 As such, they conclude that the “job stability gap 
between Japan and the United States did shrink over the last twenty-
five years for these group of workers.”104 
Third, it is generally agreed that there has been a noticeable 
increase in part-time workers in Japan.105 For instance, “the share of 
total employment (male and female) that is part-time increased from 
12.6 percent in 1990 to 19.1 percent in 2001. The comparable figures 
for the United States are 14.38 percent part-time in 1991 and 12.96 
percent part-time in 2000.”106 As such, Farber concludes that while 
there is evidence that “Japanese employers appear to be making 
increased use of part-time workers, especially women . . . there has 
been no such trend in the United States.”107 However, there is some 
disagreement over the prevalence of part-time employment in the 
United States, as Hollister finds an “increase over time in part-time 
employment, with particularly large increases in involuntary part-time 
work.” 108  In sum, there are three salient differences in certain 
categories of workers — female workers, mid-career and youth hires 
and part-time workers — when comparing employment in the United 
States and Japan. 
Scholars have found that while “both the United States and 
Japan have been faced with similar global competitive pressures,” 
employers in each country have responded differently.109  Scholars 
who insist that lifetime employment is not disappearing in Japan have 
                                                                                                             
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United States: 
the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 9. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 10; see also The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra 
note 6, at 17 (explaining that there has been a rise in non-standard employment such as part-
time workers). 
106. Farber, supra note 83, at 21. 
107. Id. at 3. 
108. Hollister, supra note 87, at 312. 
109. Farber, supra note 83, at 23. See generally Trends in Long-term Employment and 
Job Security in Japan and the United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82. 
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identified a two-tier workforce with core workers, who benefit from 
lifetime employment policies, and peripheral employees, who do 
not.110 The second group of employees usually consists of mid-career 
hires and younger employees.111 Furthermore, Farber maintains that 
the “Japanese labor market is . . . adjusting by reducing the 
incidence of ‘life-time’ jobs by increasing the role of part-time 
employment.”112 
However, Farber contends that a two-tier workforce is not found 
in the United States, and firms simply lay off workers.113 He attributes 
this difference between the United States and Japan to the lack of 
mandatory retirement in the United States, historical differences 
between the two countries, and stronger job protections in the United 
States.114 Furthermore, “[r]eassignment to other jobs within firms has 
not been an important phenomenon” in the United States whereas 
employers in Japan “have taken the approach of reassigning 
workers.”115 Therefore, it appears that the employment systems in the 
United States and Japan remain significantly different and are not 
converging as has been previously considered.116 
II. LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT MAY NOW BE SHORT-LIVED 
Given the changes in corporate governance and the recessionary 
period in Japan, many scholars have begun to question whether 
lifetime employment is still viable.117 Part II will provide an overview 
                                                                                                             
110. See Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United 
States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 23 (explaining that there is a two-tier 
structure as a built-in shock absorber); see also infra Part II.A.3. 
111. Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United States: 
the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 10-11; see also infra Part II.A. 
112. Farber, supra note 83, at 23. 
113. Id. But see Hollister, supra note 87, at 308 (stating that “[t]he first is the adoption of 
the core-periphery model, in which employers provide greater security for a select group of 
core workers while using temporary workers and outsourcing to provide the necessary 
flexibility.”). 
114. Farber, supra note 83. 
115. Id. at 23; see also infra Part II.A.3. 
116. There are many other interesting components of each employment system, such as 
changes in the quality of work. Farber explains that there is a “concern regarding a decline in 
the quality of jobs” in the United States.” Farber, supra note 83, at 4. However, the quality of 
employment, as well as many other components of employment, is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
117. See Daiji Kawaguchi & Yuko Ueno, Declining Long-term Employment in Japan, 28 
J. JAPANESE INT’L ECON. 19, 20 (2013) (noting that “academics have debated whether long-
term employment practices have survived through long-term stagnation”); see also The 
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of quantitative studies that measure whether lifetime employment is 
in fact disappearing as well as address the possible reasons for why it 
is or is not changing. First, Part II.A. explores the various quantitative 
studies, which are separated into studies that conclude that (1) 
lifetime employment is declining; (2) lifetime employment is not 
changing; or (3) lifetime employment is not disappearing but faces 
major changes. Second, Part II.B. highlights the main explanations for 
why lifetime employment has persisted. Lastly, Part II.C. covers the 
various explanations for why lifetime employment has changed. 
A. Quantitative Studies 
After the lost decade, “academics have debated whether long-
term employment practices have survived through the long-term 
stagnation.”118 The results of these quantitative studies generally fall 
into one of three categories: (1) lifetime employment is declining; (2) 
lifetime employment is not changing; and (3) lifetime employment is 
not disappearing but faces significant changes. Each category will be 
explored in turn. 
1. Lifetime Employment is Declining 
While there are many studies that explore the demise of lifetime 
employment, three especially interesting studies are explored in this 
Section. Masahiro Abe and Takeo Hoshi find that, while “it is too 
soon to declare the death of lifetime employment system, there [is] 
some evidence that suggests the popularity of the practice is indeed 
declining.”119 First, it appears that “mid-career hiring, which is not a 
usual practice for Japanese corporations, is becoming more 
standard.”120 Second, “employment adjustment by means of voluntary 
                                                                                                             
Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that “there is 
currently a lively debate among scholars and policy makers surrounding the viability of the 
practice of ‘lifetime employment.’”). 
118. The Lost Decade refers to the 1990s, when the Japanese economy stagnated. See 
Fumio Hayashi & Edward C. Prescott, The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade 5 REV. OF ECON. 
DYMANICS, 206, 206 (2002). See Kawaguchi & Ueno, supra note 117, at 20; see also Ono, 
supra note 6, at 2 (stating that “[m]ost recently, the debate focuses on the ‘lost decade’ of the 
1990s and its impact on the lifetime employment system.”). 
119 . Masao Abe & Takeo Hoshi, Corporate Finance and Human Resource 
Management, RIETI DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (Aug. 2004), http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/
publications/dp/04e027.pdf. 
120. Id. at 6; see also The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 507 
(finding that one of the firms he studied engaged in more mid-career hiring). At the time of 
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retirement and dismissal has been increasing after 1998.”121 Third, 
Abe and Hoshi suggest that there are changes in salary structures.122 
For instance, “firms that took into account the performance and 
achievement of management level employees in wage determination 
rose from 55.1% in 1998 to 64.2% in 2000.” 123  Based on the 
foregoing, Abe and Hoshi conclude that these fundamental changes 
signal a decline in lifetime employment. 
Similarly, Daiji Kawaguchi and Yuko Ueno find that lifetime 
employment is declining due to the decrease in mean tenure among 
workers in Japan.124 This differs from other studies, explored below, 
that mostly focus on job retention rates. 125  Kawaguchi and Ueno 
contend that the decrease in mean tenure is the “natural consequence 
of the low growth rate after the high-growth period ended by the early 
1970s, because the Japanese employment system is considered to 
foster firm-specific human capital and the lower growth rate 
decreases the rate of return to all types of assets, including firm 
specific human capital.” 126  Specifically, they find that “[m]ale 
workers who were born in 1970 have about 20% fewer years of job 
tenure than workers who were born in 1944.”127 In response to the 
argument that lifetime employment is only declining in certain 
industries or smaller firms, they determined that “male workers in all 
industries and firm sizes almost uniformly have experienced declining 
long-term employment.”128 
In addition, Kawaguchi and Ueno ruled out other explanations 
that scholars have argued could account for the decrease in lifetime 
employment.129 First, they found that different levels of education and 
                                                                                                             
publication, Masahiro Abe was an academic at Dokkyo University and the Research Institute 
of Economy, Trade & Industry (“RIETI”) in Japan. Takeo Hoshi was an academic at the 
University of California, San Diego as well as RIETI and the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
121. Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 7; see also The End of Lifetime Employment in 
Japan?, supra note 89, at 511 (concluding that the firms in the study used an early retirement 
incentive plan to induce employees to retire early). 
122. Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 8-9. 
123. Id. at 8. 
124. Kawaguchi & Ueno, supra note 117, at 19. At the time of publication, Daiji 
Kawaguchi was an academic at Hitotsubashi University in Japan, and Yuko Ueno was part of 
the Cabinet in the Japanese government. 
125. See infra Part III.A.3. 
126. Kawaguchi & Ueno, supra note 117, at 20. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 21. 
129. Id. at 26-32. 
2016] TIME TO RETIRE 773 
the recessionary period are not major causes of a decrease in the mean 
tenure among workers.130 In addition, Kawaguchi and Ueno note that 
“this time-series suggests that declining long-term employment is not 
a byproduct of a positive change of Japanese labor market that allows 
its workers to enjoy more opportunities for voluntary job hopping.”131 
However, they do find that the decrease in lifetime employment can 
partially be attributed to the increase in nonpermanent workers.132 
They find that the “increase of nonpermanent-regular workers and the 
decrease of mean tenure among regular workers [both] reflect the 
declining trend of the Japanese employment system.”133 
Third, Zenichi Shishido contends that “each Japanese company 
is now struggling to find a new direction of corporate governance.”134 
He explains that after 1997, “[e]mployees began to feel that the 
implicit promise of lifetime employment had been breached or would 
be breached.”135 This was particularly pronounced “when some big 
companies, including Yamaichi Securities Firm, went bankrupt, and 
responding to the pressure of capital markets, many big companies 
were forced to lay off employees.”136 In sum, these scholars argue that 
lifetime employment is decreasing in Japan as evidenced by changes 
in hiring, retirement age, salary structure, a decrease in mean tenure 
and a sense among workers that employers were not fulfilling their 
promise of lifetime employment. 
2. Lifetime Employment is Not Disappearing 
On the other hand, some scholars point out that “[w]hile the 
rhetoric of ‘the end of lifetime employment’ is presently rampant, 
concrete data on changes in traditional employment practices are 
                                                                                                             
130. Id. at 26-27. 
131. Id. at 35. 
132. Id. at 28. 
133. Id. at 30. 
134. Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: 
Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 671 (2001). Zenichi 
Shishido is a professor of law at Seikei University in Japan. 
135. Id. 
136. Id.; see also Elijah Brewer III, Hesna Genay, William Curt Hunter & George G. 
Kaufman, Does the Japanese Stock Market Price Bank-Risk? Evidence from Financial Firm 
Failures, 35 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING, 507, 535 (2003) (explaining that Yamaichi 
Securities went bankrupt in March 1998). 
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relatively scarce.”137 In fact, Michael Witt finds that “tenure lengths 
have actually increased over the past decade.”138 In 1998, which is the 
earliest date with available data, the average tenure rate was 17.6 
years for middle-school graduates, 13.4 years for high-school 
graduates, 9.2 years for graduates from junior and technology 
colleges, and 11.9 years for college and university graduates.139 In 
2010, the average tenure rate was 18.4 years, 14.8 years, 11.7 years 
and 12.8 years, respectively. 140  Consequently, Witt concludes, 
“changes have not been as revolutionary as suggested in the early 
years of the debate.”141 In sum, Witt argues that lifetime employment 
is not declining because the tenure length for groups sorted by 
educational level has increased in the past decade. 
3. Lifetime Employment is Resilient but Faces Major Changes 
The majority view is that lifetime employment is resilient, but 
major changes have occurred within the system. For instance, Hiroshi 
Ono found that “[a]lthough the population of workers who are ex-ante 
covered by lifetime employment may be shrinking, the likelihood of 
job separations has remained stable for those who are already in the 
system.”142 Specifically, Ono finds that approximately only 20% of 
the workforce enjoys the benefits of lifetime employment, which is a 
smaller proportion than previously estimated.143 Lifetime employment 
is still resilient as evidenced by how “employers prioritize[ ] their 
core workers at the expense of new hires” in response to the economic 
downturn. 144  Furthermore, “[i]n order to be more flexible and 
responsive to changes in the global economy, companies are reducing 
their core, and expanding their periphery labor force.”145 Employers 
are therefore able to “honor[] the implicit contract of lifetime 
                                                                                                             
137 . The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 490; see also 
Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2118 (explaining that “[l]ifetime employment remains the stickiest 
of all the corporate governance norms.”). 
138. Witt, supra note 4. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
142. Ono, supra note 6, at 23. 
143. Id. at 2. 
144. Id. at 23; see also The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 511 
(concluding that the firms in the study “reduced its hiring of new graduates drastically”). 
145. Ono, supra note 6, at 23; see also Trends in Long-term Employment and Job 
Security in Japan and the United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 23 
(explaining that there is a secondary segment of the labor market in Japan). 
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employment and protect those who are in the core.”146 As such, Ono 
concludes that “[l]ifetime employment is far from dead for those who 
are in the core.”147 
Similarly, Ryo Kambayashi and Takao Kato conclude that while 
lifetime employment is resilient, it “does not mean the complete 
rigidity of the Japanese employment system.”148 They find that “job 
stability of regular employees eventually fell during the final years of 
the Great Recession.”149 Specifically, “the average regular employees 
ages 35-39 with 0-4 years of tenure in 1982 had a 63 percent chance 
of being with the same employer ten years later (1992) whereas the 
average employee in the same age tenure category in 1992 had only a 
49 percent chance of being with the same employer ten years later 
(2002).”150 
Kambayashi and Kato find that the group most drastically 
affected by potential deviations from lifetime employment is regular, 
female employees over the age of 30.151 Further, similar to Ono’s 
conclusion, Kambayashi and Kato determine that “Japanese firms 
honor their promise of job security to the original members . . . 
which in turn contributes to the stability of the Japanese employment 
system.”152 In other words, employers generally protect the “original 
members” who are “typically male regular employees who are new 
graduates hires” while the “expansion members appeared to have 
served as an elaborate shock absorber.”153 
In an earlier study, Kato reached similar results and concluded 
that there is “little evidence for serious erosion of the practice of 
lifetime employment.”154 While the “evidence points to the enduring 
nature of the practice of lifetime employment in particular for prime 
                                                                                                             
146. Ono, supra note 6, at 23; see also Trends in Long-term Employment and Job 
Security in Japan and the United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 24 
(stating that “[t]he core segment of the labor market weathered the Great Recession rather 
well, continuing to enjoy strong job security, while the secondary segment of the labor market 
experienced significant loss in job security. . . .”). 
147. Ono, supra note 6, at 23. 
148. The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 26. 
149. Id. 
150. Id at 8. 
151. Id. at 9. 
152. Id. at 29. 
153. Id.; see also Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the 
United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 24 (explaining that the two-tier 
structure in Japan serves as a shock absorber). 
154. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 494. 
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age male employees . . . [t]he burden of downsizing . . . appears to 
have fallen disproportionately on young employees and middle age 
employees with short tenure, in particular middle age female 
employees with short tenure.155 As an example, Kato points to how 
“female employees ages 35-39 and 0-4 years of tenure enjoyed an 
almost 60% chance of 10-year job retention for 1977-87 whereas they 
enjoyed only about 40% of 10-year job retention for 1987-97.”156 
Kato investigated three large Japanese companies to highlight 
how the trends he identified in his study work in reality.157 One of the 
companies, Firm A, is a large manufacturing company, which is well 
known both domestically and internationally. 158  Throughout the 
1990s, Firm A cut 30% of its workers and accomplished this 
primarily by limiting hiring and transferring workers, instead of 
dismissing current employees.159 For instance, Firm A hired 3,000 
college and high school graduates in 1990, but, by the mid-1990s, 
Firm A only hired between 62 and 482 graduates each year.160 Kato 
found that two other firms adopted a similar process of limiting hiring 
and transferring employees.161 
Each of the firms that Kato investigated downsized significantly, 
from twenty-five to fifty percent, yet “no firm used layoffs as a means 
to achieve restructuring or downsizing.”162 These firms were able to 
do this by using voluntary early retirement plans and inter-company 
transfers. Voluntary early retirement plans were appealing, and “each 
firm induced a substantial number of early retirements 
successfully.”163 
Kato further found that employers who were using transfers to 
avoid discharging workers would transfer the employee within the 
firm, either to a subsidiary or related firm of the company.164 For 
example, in Kato’s study, Firm A transferred approximately 2,000 
                                                                                                             
155. Id. at 495; see also The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra 
note 6, at 9 (explaining that the burden was heaviest on female workers over 30 with relatively 
short tenure at a large firm). 
156. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 495. 
157. Id. at 498-510. 
158. Id. at 499. 
159. Id. at 500-01. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 504, 507. 
162. Id. at 510. 
163. Id. at 511; see also Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 7 (noting there has been an 
increase in voluntary retirement plans). 
164. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 501. 
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employees to related, as well as unrelated, firms each year in 1995 
and 1997.165 Thus, firms have been “downsizing their labor force by 
expanding the definition of the firm to include the firm’s subsidiaries 
and related firms . . . [thus] [l]ifetime employment with the firm 
now often means lifetime employment with the firm and its 
subsidiaries and related firms.”166 Rather than viewing this change as 
the end of lifetime employment, Kato finds that “both HR managers 
and top union officials tend to view the increasing incidents of 
permanent transfers in recent years as a necessary modification of the 
notion of lifetime employment.”167 It is notable, however, that some 
“employees were generally unhappy about the prospect of becoming 
employees of somewhat less prestigious subsidiaries and related 
firms.”168 
Another study noted that lifetime employment continues to be 
resilient in Japan because both employees and employers like the 
system. For example, Ono’s study used data that both employees and 
employers want to maintain lifetime employment as “counterevidence 
to the anecdotal view that lifetime employment is a thing of the 
past.”169 In a 2007 survey by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and 
Training, “almost 90 percent of companies . . . aimed to maintain 
lifetime employment policies in their current or partially adjusted 
form.” 170  In addition, a survey in 2010 shows that 60% of new 
recruits wanted to stay at the same company.171 
The quantitative studies that examine lifetime employment fall 
into three main categories. First, some scholars have found that 
lifetime employment is disappearing, as evidenced by changes in 
hiring, retirement age and a decrease in mean tenure, among others. 
                                                                                                             
165. Id.  
166. Id. at 511; see also Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 25 (explaining “[i]n this sense, 
permanent shukko [or transfers] may be viewed as an attempt to maintain lifetime employment 
system in the increasing volatile economy.”). 
167. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 512. 
168. Id.; see infra Part III for a discussion of whether this is just a modification of 
lifetime employment or a symptom of the decline in lifetime employment, and furthermore, 
whether this distinction is important. 
169. Ono, supra note 6, at 25. 
170. Witt, supra note 4, at 7; see also Ono, supra note 6, at 25 (explaining that “survey 
results from 1999 show that 60.6% of personnel managers intend to ‘maintain lifetime 
employment as much as possible,’ an increase from the 46.8% reported in 1997”). 
171. Witt, supra note 4, at 7; see also Ono, supra note 6, at 24 (stating “[i]n fact, the 
support base seems to be increasing. A worker survey conducted in 2004 shows that 78% of 
workers are in favor of lifetime employment, an increase of 5.7% from the first survey 
conducted in 1999.”). 
778 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:753 
Second, others contend that lifetime employment is not disappearing. 
Third, the majority view is that while lifetime employment is resilient, 
there have been significant changes to the employment system in 
Japan. 
B.  Non-Quantitative Studies 
1.  Explanations for Why Lifetime Employment has Persisted 
The following Section discusses the rich literature concerning 
institutional complementarities in Japanese corporate governance. In 
his seminal article, Aoki explains that “corporate governance cannot 
be introduced or maintained in either a piecemeal or autonomous way 
. . . its effectiveness must be supported by complementary 
institutional arrangements. . . . ” 172  Specifically, “the Japanese 
employment system . . . is complementary to the Japanese financial 
system [] characterized by stable financial corporate grouping, such as 
banks and institutional shareholders[,] as stable, long-term suppliers 
of capital.”173 In other words, Japanese companies “obtain funding 
from banks, instead of capital markets,” and these banks tend to have 
“long-term commitments to firms.” 174 
Japanese firms therefore generally operate according to the 
stakeholder system where “stakeholders . . . emphasize strategic 
interests . . . and are likely to be committed to the long term 
interests of the firm.”175 As long-term investors, “main banks and 
silent shareholders support managers’ decisions to maintain 
employment, as long as performance ultimately translates into 
positive profits – even if the firms are facing performance 
                                                                                                             
172. Masahiko Aoki, The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional 
Complementarity, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 657, 657 (1994). 
173. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 491; see also Noda, 
supra note 20, at 364 (stating that “[l]ong-term employment practices are considered to have 
complementarities with the corporate finance and ownership structure, such as the main bank 
system and cross-shareholding”). 
174. Witt, supra note 4, at 14; Noda, supra note 20, at 365, 370 (noting that the main 
banks “comprise the typical Japanese stakeholders”); see also Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 
3 (explaining that the bank is typically the corporation’s largest lender and  stating that “[a] 
Japanese corporation has a long-term relationship with a bank. . . . ”). 
175. Noda, supra note 20, at 370; see also Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 3 (stating 
that “[m]any researchers have pointed out that the corporate governance of Japanese firms fit 
the stakeholder view of the corporate governance very well. . . . Corporations seem to be 
operated in the interests of many types of stakeholders, including employees. . . . ”). 
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declines.”176 Tomohiko Noda notes that this stakeholder system is the 
opposite of the Anglo-American model, where shareholders who 
“emphasize financial interests . . . do not pursue long-term profits . 
. . [and a]ccordingly take a relatively dispassionate attitude toward 
implicit long-term employment contracts and do not hesitate to 
pressure firms to downsize.”177 Therefore, the corporate governance 
structure in Japan tends to help reinforce lifetime employment as 
opposed to corporate governance in Anglo-American States.178 
Additionally, the relative lack of foreign investment has helped 
maintain Japan’s form of corporate governance, thus helping to 
maintain lifetime employment. Until the early 2000s, foreign 
investors were relatively uncommon in Japan.179 In the early 1990s, 
the share of foreign ownership in the Tokyo Stock Exchange was four 
percent.180 The lack of foreign investment helped maintain lifetime 
employment because “[f]oreign investors . . . are likely to be strong 
proponents of shareholder capitalism; [thus] they are likely to have 
little patience for Japan’s existing system, which protects employees’ 
interests even at the sacrifice of shareholders’ interests to some 
extent.”181 
Some scholars also argue that the composition of a company’s 
board of directors has a direct impact on the viability of lifetime 
employment.182 Historically, in Japan “boards of directors were rather 
large and primarily occupied by managers chosen from inside the 
                                                                                                             
176. Noda, supra note 20, at 370; see also Witt, supra note 4, at 14 (stating that “[t]he 
combination of weak corporate governance and long-term finance enables long term 
employment. Jointly, they offer at least partial protection against shareholder demands to 
improve profitability through layoffs.”). 
177. Noda, supra note 20, at 369. 
178 . On the other hand, some scholars recognize that “[t]he effects of ownership 
structure are difficult to interpret a priori.” Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 13. 
Specifically, “[i]f we consider the monitoring role of large shareholders or banks, a company 
with concentrated ownership or strong ties with the banking sector is more likely to cut jobs 
since strong monitoring forces the company to concentrate on profit maximization.” Id. 
179. Noda, supra note 20; see also Witt, supra note 4, at 5 (explaining that “foreigners 
increased their share from 5.8 percent in 1980 to 18.8 percent in 2000 and 26.0 percent in 
2009”). 
180. Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 5. 
181 . Noda, supra note 20, at 370; see also Witt, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that 
“[i]ncreased foreign shareholdings have meant pressure for changes in corporate governance 
toward more attention to shareholders’ interests.”). 
182. Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 
509 (explaining that lifetime employment is supported by institutions such as inside boards of 
directors). 
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company.” 183  Abe and Shimizutani note that a board with more 
insiders will help maintain lifetime employment because “[b]oth 
corporate governance theory and macroeconomic theory predict that 
companies with fewer outside directors are more inclined to pursue 
the interests of their employees rather than . . . shareholders.”184 
As a result, “insider managers are less likely to lay off current 
employees and instead are more likely to rely on reducing new hiring 
to reduce labor costs.”185 Scholars point out that “[t]his finding is 
consistent with the “moral hazard view . . . which suggests that in 
firms where employee influence is strong and directors are selected 
from among employees of the firm tend to try to provide job security 
[.]” 186 In conclusion, many scholars contend that Japanese corporate 
governance has helped maintain lifetime employment. 
Scholars have set forth a variety of other reasons to explain why 
lifetime employment has remained prevalent in Japan. Some scholars 
note that because the legal framework reinforces lifetime 
employment, it is possible that Japanese courts have helped maintain 
lifetime employment. 187  According to the Global Competitiveness 
Report, Japan has the lowest score of all Asian countries for ease of 
hiring and firing.188 Additionally, Gilson and Roe contend that “the 
Japanese “government may have helped to destroy the external labor 
market . . . [by] discourag[ing] lateral hiring, thereby helping to keep 
the external labor market weak. . . . ”189 
Additionally, Witt contends that “the existing system has 
enjoyed a great deal of legitimacy, and the will to effect major 
changes seems to be weak, not only among people in general, but also 
among top managers.”190 With respect to banking institutions, given 
how intertwined the institutions’ board of directors, shareholders, and 
                                                                                                             
183. Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 5; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 509 
(stating that “firms’ board consist of insider-employees”). 
184. Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 7. 
185. Id. at 14; see also Witt, supra note 4, at 14 (stating that “Japanese firms tends to be 
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186. Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also Witt, supra note 4, at 14 
(explaining that “[i]n effect, Japanese firms tend to be run by employees for employees.”). 
187. See Witt, supra note 4, at 7; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 525 (explaining 
that “[t]he second hypothesis is that Japanese courts buttressed lifetime employment.”); infra 
Part III. 
188. Witt, supra note 4, at 7. 
189. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 527. 
190. Witt, supra note 4, at 15. 
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employees are, it is possible that “the high levels of 
complementarities in the business system constrain the extent of 
possible changes.”191 Witt maintains that this constraint on change is 
also reinforced by the fact that the “consensual nature of decision-
making in the Japanese political economy is prone to deadlock.”192 
Relatedly, Witt further explains that informal changes are 
infrequent because “such deviant behaviour happens at relatively low 
levels, which means that they cannot build up sufficient pressure on 
policy-makers to change the formal institutional structure.”193 Lastly, 
Gilson and Roe point out “that managers feared that poaching 
employees mid-career from other firms risked adversely affecting the 
morale of the firm’s existing employees and reducing the 
effectiveness of the internal labor market.”194 Furthermore, it has been 
argued that lifetime employment has persisted because “managers 
attempt to retain labour in order to avoid any sunk costs associated 
with human capital investments” and “prefer to maintain existing 
employment levels, even in times of recession, so that they have 
ready access to a high-quality workforce.”195 
2. Explanations for Why Lifetime Employment is Changing 
Many scholars point to fundamental changes in Japanese 
corporate governance to explain why the current lifetime employment 
system is changing.196 Prior to the Lost Decade, “[m]onitoring by the 
main bank and other business group members represented the main 
mechanism of corporate governance.”197 These long-term investors 
tended to support management’s employment decisions and did not 
exert pressure on the company to downsize. 198  However, 
“shareholding patterns begin to shift during the ‘lost decade’ of the 
                                                                                                             
191. Id. at 15; see also supra Part II.B.1. 
192. Witt, supra note 4, at 15. 
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1990s” when “the importance of bank lending . . . declined and 
markets . . . bec[a]me more important.” 199  As a result, “[m]any 
corporations increased their bond issues in domestic as well as foreign 
markets and reduced their dependence on bank loans, which had 
previously served as a hallmark of Japanese corporate financing.”200 
Further, cross-shareholding decreased from eighteen percent in the 
early 1990s to less than eight percent by 2003.201 Additionally, there 
was a “sharp decline in proportion held by financial institutions from 
34 percent in 1991 to 25 percent in 2001.”202 
Furthermore, “[i]ncreased foreign shareholdings have meant 
pressure for changes in corporate governance toward[s] more 
attention to shareholders’ interests.” 203  The proportion of “foreign 
ownership in the Tokyo Stock Exchange increased from about 4% in 
the early 1990s to more than 18% in 2002.”204 Abe and Hoshi also 
find that “firms with high foreign ownership and low bank ownership 
are more likely to downsize their workforce.”205  In addition, they 
determine that firms “that show high level[s] of foreign ownership 
were more likely to have human resource management practices that 
deviate from the traditional Japanese practice.” 206  In sum, these 
scholars point to these fundamental changes in corporate governance, 
namely the increased prioritization of shareholder’s interests, to 
explain changes in the lifetime employment system. 
Tomohiko Noda conducted a fascinating study to analyze the 
relationship between the rate of employment adjustment and changes 
in corporate governance.207 In the study, Noda finds that, “[a]lthough 
firms with close main bank ties tended, prior to 1997, to postpone 
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downsizing until they had faced 2 consecutive years of losses, after 
1997, they became unable to maintain employment levels for this 
long of a period.”208  Large Japanese firms were able to maintain 
employment because of their main bank ties and cross-shareholding, 
which sought to “protect firm-specific human capital investments.”209 
Noda notes that main banks only began to pressure firms to downsize 
when “they face the possibility of there being unrecoverable loan 
interest.”210 
Ultimately, Noda concludes that the decline of main bank 
relationships and increase in foreign investors has had an impact on 
the speed of employment adjustment. 211  He contends that the 
“reduced function of main banks and the increased influence of 
foreign owners have changed the timing of downsizing, so that it 
occurs earlier than had been the case before 1997.”212 In fact, he 
found that foreign investors have “started to encourage downsizing, 
even in times of positive profits.”213 Therefore, the combination of the 
decline of main bank relationships and the increase of foreign 
investors has resulted in a faster employment adjustment rate.214 
Furthermore, scholars point to changes in the composition of 
boards of directors to explain changes in the lifetime employment 
system. Abe and Shimizutani note that since the mid-1990s, “an 
increase in the ratio of outside directors in board composition can be 
observed, though inside directors are still dominant in many 
companies.” 215  For example, in 1991, “the median proportion of 
insiders among all board members was 74 percent, but the figure 
decreased to 67 percent in 2001.”216 Abe and Shimizutani determine 
that: 
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784 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:753 
[T]he higher the share of outside directors, the more likely are 
firms with excess employment to implement lay offs and/or use 
voluntary or early retirement schemes. On the other hand, firms 
with a large number of inside directors are instead more likely to 
reduce new hiring to protect incumbent employees.217 
These results are “consistent with the stakeholder view of the 
firm, which suggests that inside directors are more concerned with 
protecting the interests of employees than with profit-maximization as 
assumed by neoclassical theory.”218 Therefore, there is evidence that 
these fundamental corporate governance changes account for changes 
in the lifetime employment system in Japan. 
Scholars also highlight a variety of other factors that may be 
changing the lifetime employment system. First, there are a variety of 
external factors, such as the financial crisis, the aftermath of the 2011 
earthquake in Japan, competition from other Asian countries, Japan’s 
struggle with the IT revolution, and the population crisis, all of which 
might result in drastic changes to systems like lifetime 
employment.219 
Second, some scholars contend that lifetime employment has 
hurt the Japanese economy. Tsuneki and Matsunaka explain that 
“[c]ritics have pointed to the big efficiency losses associated with a 
labor market that cannot adapt quickly to changing demands for its 
products.” 220  However, Tsuneki and Matsunaka contend this 
argument is not particularly persuasive because it “is unable to 
explain why post-war Japan succeeded economically at least until the 
1980s.”221 
Third, dramatic technological improvements can help to explain 
changes in Japan’s employment system. Given that the value of 
lifetime employment is partially found in the “accumulation of firm-
specific knowledge in the long-run, it is more effective in an 
economic environment growing at a stable rate and with relatively 
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small technical changes.”222 Consequently, Tsuneki and Matsunaka 
suggest that the employment system needs to change because new 
technologies have resulted in the need to “restructure existing 
industries and develop new industries” which requires “the migration 
of the labor force from old to new businesses and industries.”223 
Fourth, while labor law has been cited as a reason for lifetime 
employment’s persistence, the law does not require long-term 
employment contracts. 224  In fact, Japanese labor law “allows for 
various types of labor contracts.”225 Furthermore, the Labor Standard 
Law was revised in 1998 to allow Japanese companies to write up 
multi-year fixed term contracts.226 Therefore, Kambayashi and Kato 
maintain that, “the 1998 revision of the Labor Standard Law is 
potentially a cause for the weakening of the ‘lifetime employment’ 
system.’”227 
Lastly, there are changes to employment and working conditions 
that may be adding to the impetus for change. For instance, the “wage 
payment system based on seniority is also being reformed to reflect 
performance measures more directly.”228 Tsuneki and Matsunaka also 
note that “Japanese labor law has recently begun to emphasize the 
activation of the external labor market by the deregulation of the 
private employment agency business and public support to the 
vocational training provided to the unemployed.”229 This could have a 
large impact on the viability of lifetime employment because these 
changes open up the labor market and, as Gilson and Roe explain, a 
closed external labor market reinforces the norm of lifetime 
employment. 230  Another explanation points to changes in 
subsidization policies, where, instead of giving subsidies to industries 
facing economic difficulties, there is a changed “subsidization policy 
related to newly created industries such as those pertaining to 
information, environment, medicine and welfare industries. . . . ” 
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which is a significant departure from the subsidization policies that 
helped to maintain lifetime employment in existing industries.231 
III. THE END OF LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT? NOT IN MY 
LIFETIME 
A. Lifetime Employment is Changing But Not Disappearing 
A thorough examination of lifetime employment indicates that 
the system is changing.232 In many studies, scholars argue that even 
though the number of workers who enjoy lifetime employment is 
decreasing, the system is in fact not disappearing because employers 
are honoring existing promises with core workers.233 Hypothetically, 
however, if the number of employees who enjoy lifetime employment 
is decreasing now, this likely means that the system will become less 
prevalent in the future.. 
Currently, lifetime employment only applies to twenty percent of 
the working population in Japan.234 Scholars generally agree that the 
recession hit younger workers the hardest, and consequently, lifetime 
employment is increasingly not applying to them.235 If graduates are 
entering the workforce without the promise of lifetime employment, 
this must necessarily mean that as the population ages, fewer workers 
will be part of the lifetime employment system. This would therefore 
indicate that lifetime employment is changing and will decline in the 
future. 
Furthermore, the reasons that scholars have set forth to explain 
the changes in lifetime employment are persuasive. First, the changes 
in corporate governance in Japan support the idea that lifetime 
employment is changing.236 The strength of the main bank and the 
decline of cross-shareholding, combined with an increase in foreign 
influence and the proliferation of the use of “outside” board of 
directors, help to explain why companies are more unwilling to 
commit to lifetime employment.237 In addition, there have been major 
changes in Japanese society, such as the population crisis and 
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recession, which necessitate a change in the employment system.238 
This, however, does not necessarily mean that lifetime employment 
will disappear altogether. 
B. Policy Implications 
Ultimately, the focus on whether the system is disappearing 
seems misplaced. Scholars and policy-makers should focus more on 
the broader societal and economic implications of changes in the 
employment system generally, without regard to whether it fits into 
the mold of the lifetime employment system. Japan is experiencing a 
severe population crisis with a drastically increasing aging population 
and a decreasing working population.239 Consequently, policy-makers 
are becoming more concerned about the aging population and its 
effect on society, for example as it relates to pension systems.240 
Therefore, instead of focusing on the viability of lifetime 
employment, policy-makers and scholars should focus on figuring out 
the best employment system for society in Japan today. Since the 
“Japanese labor market [now] has a dual nature” with regular and 
non-regular workers, there should be an emphasis on how to make 
non-regular workers more productive and efficient for the 
economy. 241  In addition, as Stephen Mulrenan explains, “[T]he 
Government is not doing anything to encourage a mid-career job 
market. It needs to introduce policies that allow companies to shed 
excess labour when they don’t need it, and hire when they do need 
it.”242 
Furthermore, the emphasis on lifetime employment has hurt 
female workers and younger workers more acutely. 243  Scholars 
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generally agree that female workers have historically been excluded 
from the lifetime employment system.”244 In fact, Ono explains that 
“the lifetime employment system presumed a complete specialization 
between the sexes with one spouse fully committed to market work 
and the other devoted to non-market work.” 245  Adhering to this 
gendered practice, however, is problematic given the diminishing 
workforce in Japan.246 
Encouraging more women to work would be a simple and 
obvious way to help increase the workforce population in Japan.247 
Some contend that this is easier said than done because “it may 
require a paradigm shift in the cultured norms and mentality among 
Japanese employers and workers in order to achieve a better balance 
between work and family in the long run.”248 Still, extending more 
favorable employment options to women can help to encourage mid-
career hires and provide more flexibility in hiring, which generally 
would “enable women who leave the workforce to start their families 
to more easily come back into meaningful jobs.’”249 
In addition, employers have tried to maintain lifetime 
employment by cutting back on hiring recent graduates.250 As such, 
this emphasis on honoring lifetime employment promises has 
disproportionately burdened younger generations. Consequently, 
lifetime employment has created a “serious youth unemployment 
problem.”251 For instance, “the unemployment rate in Japan has risen 
most rapidly for those aged 15–24 in the 1990s.”252  Additionally, 
Kato notes that, “the firm’s labor force is aging rapidly, which 
weakens the dynamism of the organization.”253 
The emphasis on lifetime employment is exacerbating the 
consequences of an aging population in Japan. Fewer graduates are 
able to meaningfully join the workforce while older generations 
continue to work.254 Consequently, desperate attempts to maintain the 
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lifetime employment system have resulted in hurting younger and 
female workers, which may be the key to mitigating the aging 
population problem. Therefore, while lifetime employment has been 
and continues to be an important institution to study, scholars and 
policy-makers should focus on making sure that fundamental changes 
in the employment system help mitigate societal and economic 
problems in Japan. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has provided an overview of the lifetime 
employment system and has attempted to answer the question: is 
lifetime employment disappearing. While lifetime employment has 
changed significantly, this does not necessarily mean that the system 
will disappear altogether. Ultimately, however, policymakers and 
scholars should focus less on whether lifetime employment is 
disappearing and more on how the employment system can be 
changed to better fit Japan’s economy and society today.   
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